We study two-stage all-pay auctions with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize. Each player may win either one or two prizes. We analyze the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of our model with two players where each player's marginal values for the prizes are decreasing, constant or increasing.
Introduction
In winner-take-all contests, all contestants including those who do not win the prize, incur costs as a result of their e¤orts. However, only the winner receives the prize. Winner-take-all contests have been applied to numerous settings including rent-seeking and lobbying in organizations, R&D races, political contests, promotions in labor markets, trade wars, military con ‡icts and biological wars of attrition. The most common winner take-all contest is the all-pay auction. In the standard (one-stage) all-pay auction each player submits a bid (e¤ort) for the prize and the player who submits the highest bid receives the prize, but, independently of success, all players bear the cost of their bids. In the economic literature, all-pay auctions are usually studied under complete information where each player's value for the prize is common player to win the other prizes in the later stages. In particular, in sequential multi-prize contests, each player has to decide in which stages he will compete to win and in which stages he will quit and conserve his e¤ort (resources) for the other rounds.
In our sequential two-prize all pay auction with two players, we …nd the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium where no player quits in the …rst stage such that both players compete to win both of the prizes.
The players use mixed strategies in both stages and therefore each has a chance to win both prizes as well as none of them. The players' behavior in the second stage is similar to that of the standard one-stage all-pay auction, but their behavior in the …rst stage is completely unique. For example, in contrast to the standard one-stage all-pay auction, both players may have positive expected payo¤s. Moreover, even if a player is weaker than the other player (his marginal values are lower than those of his opponent) he may have a positive expected payo¤. On the other hand, if both players'marginal values are increasing, then one of the players necessarily has an expected payo¤ of zero (similar to the standard one-stage all-pay auction).
We also show that, in contrast to the standard one-stage all-pay auction, both players may have expected payo¤s of zero even if they have di¤erent marginal values for the prizes awarded in the contest.
In our sequential two-prize all-pay auction with more than two players the equilibrium is not unique, and a complete characterization of the equilibrium behavior is quite complicated. However, the extension of the equilibrium of our model with two players to the case with more than two players is quite simple. We games is the winner of the contest. 5 In contrast to our multi-prize model, in all of the above papers the players compete for one prize that is allocated to the winner in the …nal stage. The paper most related to our work is Kovenock The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce our sequential two-prize all-pay auction, and in Section 3 we analyze the unique equilibrium behavior in two-prize all-pay auctions with two players. In Section 4 we show several conclusions about the players'expected payo¤s in the two-prize all-pay auction.
In Section 5 we illustrate an extension of our results to the case with more than two players. Section 6
concludes.
The model
We consider a sequential all-pay auction with two players which we denote by i = a; b; and two stages which we denote by t = 1; 2. In each of the stages a single (identical) prize is awarded. Let v 
Equilibrium
In order to analyze the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a sequential two-prize all-pay auction we begin by analyzing the second stage and go backwards to the …rst stage.
The second stage
Assume that player i's value in the second stage is v i ; i = a; b, and, without loss of generality, assume that the players' values satisfy v 
Thus, player a's equilibrium e¤ort is uniformly distributed, that is
while player b's equilibrium e¤ort is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function
The respective expected payo¤s in the second stage are u 
The …rst stage
Assume that player i's value in stage t = 1; 2 is v 
Note that since the players'marginal values are positive, the induced marginal values given by (1) are positive as well. Then, using the induced marginal values, the players'equilibrium strategies in the …rst stage of the sequential two-prize all-pay auction are stated in the following result.
Theorem 1 In the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the sequential two-prize all-pay auction, the players' strategies in the …rst stage are as follows:
; player a's equilibrium e¤ ort is distributed according to
while player b's equilibrium e¤ ort is distributed according to
The respective expected payo¤ s in the …rst stage are u 
Using the induced values b v
; the above indi¤erence conditions can be written as
The system of equations (4) describing the players' mixed strategies F . Hence, according to Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996) , there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in the …rst stage of the sequential two-prize all-pay auction which is given by:
where the players'expected payo¤s are u 
or alternatively by:
Thus, the explicit distribution functions are:
Using equation (8) we can derive several results about the players'total expected payo¤s in the contest.
Proposition 1
In the sequential two-prize all-pay auction, if each player's marginal values are decreasing, the player with the highest marginal value has the highest total expected payo¤ .
Proof. We assume that v 
0:
Then, since the marginal values are decreasing, by our assumption we obtain that v
by (2) and (8) and player b's total expected payo¤ is
Thus, the di¤erence between the players'expected payo¤s satis…es Similar to the standard all-pay auction with two players in which at least one of the players has an expected payo¤ of zero, we obtain Proposition 3 In the sequential two-prize all-pay auction, if both players' marginal values are increasing, then one of the players necessarily has an expected payo¤ of zero.
Proof. By (2) and (3) 
Thus we obtain a contradiction to our assumption b v Proof. By (2) and (3), no player has a positive expected payo¤ in the contest i¤ the following three conditions are satis…ed:
and given (9) and (8) b v (9) and (10) are satis…ed.
Extensions
Up to this point we considered sequential contests with only two players. It is important to note that similar to the standard one-stage all-pay auction with more than two players (n > 2), in our model with more 7 In a similar way it can be shown that
than two players, the equilibrium strategies are not necessarily unique. Below we show the extension of the equilibrium of our model with two players to the case with more than two players. The players'strategies in the second stage are similar to the standard all-pay auction (see Baye, Kovenock and de Vries, 1996 ) and therefore we focus only on the equilibrium strategies in the …rst stage where the players' marginal values are decreasing. 8 In this equilibrium, the two players with the highest induced marginal values are the only active players in the …rst stage.
First, we denote by v max h the h-highest marginal value in the set fv 6 Concluding remarks
In the sequential two-prize all-pay auction we presented, if players have diminishing, constant or increasing marginal returns with respect to winning additional auction, the players' implicit valuations in the …rst stage depend non-linearly on both of the marginal valuations of both of the players. Hence, the players' behavior in the …rst stage is unexpected which suggest that we are dealing with an interesting and challenging multi-stage model. 9 Player c is not an active player. 
